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Bolivia: How Absolute is Morales’ 
Power?
Miguel A. Buitrago
Bolivian president Evo Morales began his second period in office on January 22, 2010, 
following a sweeping win with 64 percent of the vote in the December 2009 early gen­
eral election. As a result, Morales can count on a two­thirds majority in the Senate and a 
close to absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies. This will allow him to continue 
with his “refounding of Bolivia” – provided his party can win the upcoming municipal 
and prefecture elections on April 4. 
Analysis
President Morales has managed to consolidate his power. Since the December 6 election 
he has tilted the current power struggle considerably in his favor by neutralizing most 
of the opposition. The government’s next steps will be to reform the judicial branch 
and the electoral court. At the same time, it will have to pass the legal framework for 
the constitutionally mandated regional, municipal and indigenous autonomic process. 
Moreover, it will have to step up the political campaign to win prefectures and munic­
ipal governments from the opposition in April 2010 as absolute control of government 
will depend on the outcome of these elections.
Some constraints to the ruling party, the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), might 
come from within its ranks. The intellectuals and middle­class assembly members, 
especially in the Senate, were included in the lists of candidates as part of a strategy 
to entice middle­class voters to support Morales. The problem might be that these 
people do not support the totality of the government’s more radical dogmas.
The current opposition, made up of Plan Progreso para Bolivia­Convergencia Na­
cional and Unidad Nacional, has been significantly weakened in the legislative as 
well as in the political arena. At present there are doubts as to what role they will 
play in the new legislature.
The traditional opposition, made up of parties such as MNR, ADN, MIR, CSU, etc., 
seems to have opted to retreat to the departmental level. These parties will be tak­
ing part in the next prefecture and municipal elections in April 2010. They will seek 
to articulate a new kind of opposition at the departmental level. 
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1.  Morales’ First Presidential Period
When Evo Morales took office in January 2006, his 
government started out on a favorable wind. First 
of all, Bolivia had reached a historical moment in 
its history. In the December 2005 general elections, 
Morales became the first indigenous candidate 
to win the presidency, with an equally historical 
result (54 percent of the vote) and as the country 
emerged from a deep political crisis. Second, the 
macroeconomic conditions in the country were pos­
itive. Real GDP was growing at 4 percent, the bal­
ance of payments was strong, inflation was low (5 
percent in 2005), the fiscal situation had improved 
(fiscal deficit of 2.3 percent of GDP), and the in­
ternational reserves had reached a historical high 
(USD 500 million)1. Third, and in the background 
of that favorable economic picture, the internation­
al community of creditors had promised support 
for the new government through the elimination 
of a big part of Bolivia’s foreign debt, an act which 
even further improved Bolivia’s financial situa­
tion. In addition to picking up moral support from 
Cuba, Bolivia received promises from Caracas of 
plentiful oil supplies and loans in various forms. 
In Madrid Morales received an offer to eliminate 
50 percent of Bolivia’s debt as long as that money 
was invested in education. In China Morales re­
ceived promises of much needed investment. The 
IMF promised to write off Bolivia’s debt up to 2005 
(USD 231 million).2 The World Bank and the IADB 
also promised similar actions. The international 
community was eager to lend its hand and to be a 
part of such a historical moment.
In the first four years of his term, President 
Morales and his government were able to realize 
many campaign promises. In one of its first signif­
icant actions, on May 1, 2006, the government na­
tionalized Bolivia’s natural gas and oil resources, 
which were under majority control of several in­
ternational energy companies. In the process, the 
government renegotiated the contracts it had with 
these companies and was able to raise its revenue 
intake to close to 80 percent. 
In this manner Morales managed to preside 
over the first two budget surpluses in Bolivia’s 
recent history (2006 and 2007), which were a di­
rect result of debt forgiveness and increased rev­
1 IMF Country Report , July 2006, online: <http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06270.pdf>.
2 IMF Press release 05/289, online: <http://www.imf.org/exter­
nal/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05289.htm>.
enue from the sale of natural gas to neighboring 
Brazil and Argentina. With these funds, the gov­
ernment was able to introduce a series of social 
payments for the elderly, for school­aged children 
and for mothers­to­be. Furthermore, the MAS gov­
ernment followed through with its promise to re­
write the country’s constitution. It introduced a 
Constitutional Assembly on August 6, 2006, which, 
after having extended its deadline twice, came 
up with a highly conflictive constitutional text 
in November 2007. The final draft was negotiated 
with the opposition in Congress, then approved 
by the population in a national referendum. In 
January 2009 Bolivians approved the new consti­
tution with 61 percent of the vote3. In addition to 
the above actions, the government defended the 
cultivation of coca leaves. A provision of the new 
constitution allows for self­controlled cultivation. 
Finally, the government managed to improve rela­
tions with long­time rival Chile and established 
close cooperation with Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil and 
Iran. The latter promised investments and energy 
cooperation.
However, these successes did not come without 
failures. On the economic front, the Bolivian gov­
ernment failed to translate the favorable macro­
economic and fiscal conditions as well as the state­
led investment into less unemployment, less cor­
ruption and lower inflation. To the contrary, infla­
tion rose persistently, with some months showing 
a double­digit rise. In 2008 there were once again 
fiscal deficits. At the same time, on the political 
front the government’s unrestrained and polemic 
political discourse – from President Morales as 
well as his vice president Alvaro Garcia – polar­
ized the population. Vivid examples of this polar­
ization included the Cochabamba riots in January 
2007, during which several people died; the May 
4, 2008 referendum on autonomy, carried out in 
several opposition provinces without the consent 
of the central government; and the Porvenir kill­
ings in September 2008, where several MAS sup­
porters were shot, allegedly by the opposition. 
In addition, the government’s image suffered 
due to corruption and state brutality allegations. 
In early 2009 the president of the state oil compa­
ny YPFB, Santos Ramirez, was formally charged 
with receiving bribes in exchange for government 
3 La Razón, February 3, 2009, online: <http://www.la­razon.
com/versiones/20090203_006627/nota_247_757202.htm>.
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contracts. Also, in April 2009 a special Army com­
mando killed a group of alleged international ter­
rorists in the name of state security. Finally, on the 
international front, Morales and his government 
seriously damaged diplomatic relations with the 
US, and some of Bolivia’s neighbors such as Peru. 
The poor relations between Morales and the Bush 
administration led the US government to remove 
Bolivia from the Andean Trade Preference and 
Drug Eradication Act agreement, which had al­
lowed Bolivian products preferential access to US 
markets. 
2.  Before and After the Elections
The early general elections of December 2009 
were carried out under relative certainty due to 
Morales’ significant lead in the polls, as shown in 
Figure 1. This figure shows the percentage of the 
vote Morales and his opponents were predicted to 
receive in the months leading up to election day. 
From a popularity rating in the 40 percent range 
in June 2009, Morales was able to steadily im­
prove his image among the electorate. One factor 
helping his image was the general perception that 
his government had performed well, especially 
in terms of its social policies. Another factor was 
the fact that the opposition was never really able 
to present a credible alternative candidate to the 
electorate. This might be attributable to the fact 
that Reyes Villa and Doria Medina were leading 
relatively new political forces as compared to the 
traditional and seasoned political parties such as 
the MNR, MIR and ADN, which have a longer 
institutional history. In particular, Reyes Villa’s 
PPB­CN was a coalition of several relatively new 
parties.
Figure 1 also shows the significant gap between 
Morales and his closest rivals. The likely outcome 
was thus relatively clear because, according to the 
constitution, the elections would not go to a second 
round if either of the following conditions were 
met: a) the winner wins if he receives more than 
50 percent of the vote; and b) if the winner does 
not achieve a relative majority (Bolivians call this 
absolute majority), he would have to win with at 
least 40 percent of the vote and have a 10­percent­
age­points lead over the second runner­up. The 
magnitude of the gap gave Morales security and 
allowed him to concentrate on his own strategy to 
boost his support in the media luna region rather 
than on his opponents’ campaigns. Morales ran an 
aggressive rather than a defensive campaign.
Figure 1: Intention Vote (IAOMLR)
Source: Author’s own compilation based on data from 
Angus Reid.
Table 1 shows the results for the most recent elec­
tion and for the previous general election in De­
cember 2005. The most obvious conclusion is that 
Morales won the 2009 election with an advantage 
of 33 percentage points, more than double the votes 
received by his closest opponent. This was more 
than enough to avoid a second round. However, it 
is when we break down the results by department 
that it really becomes clear why Morales won with 
such a big margin.
Table 1: Electoral Results 2009 and 2005 (in %)
Source: Author’s own compilation using data from the 
National Electoral Court.
4 The media luna is a region made up from the provinces of 
Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, Sucre and Tarija where the opposi­
tion was strongly established. It was denominated media luna 
or half moon because of the shape this region makes on the 
map of Bolivia.
Evo Morales
MAS
Manfred 
Reyes Villa
PPB­CN/NFR
Samuel Doria 
Medina
UN
2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005
National 63 54 27 0.7 6 8
Chuquisaca 56 54 34 1,0 6 8
La Paz 80 66 9 0.6 8 7
Cochabamba 66 65 27 0.8 5 5
Oruro 79 62 9 0.5 6 5
Potosi 78 58 4 1,0 2 5
Tarija 51 31 38 0.5 7 7
Santa Cruz 41 33 53 0.4 4 12
Beni 38 16 53 0.3 7 6
Pando 45 20 51 0.2 3 23
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First of all, Morales managed to increase his lead 
over 2005 in the departments where he won. In La 
Paz, Oruro and Potosi, there was an increase of 14, 
17, and 20 percentage points respectively. More 
importantly, he also managed to gain support in 
the so­called media luna departments, which had 
been opposition strongholds in 2005. In Tarija he 
gained 20 points; in Santa Cruz, 8 points; in Beni, 
22 points; and in Pando, 25 points. These results 
clearly show how Morales was able to change his 
image in the opposition­controlled provinces in 
order to gain votes. The reasons he was able to do 
so are discussed in the next section.
Reyes Villa also managed a modest gain in sup­
port, but at the expense of Doria Medina and those 
parties that did not participate this time around 
but were more dominant in 2005: PODEMOS, 
MNR, and MIR. Looking at the results, we can see 
that Reyes Villa’s rise in popularity from 2005 to 
2009 was significant in all departments, except per­
haps in Potosi. It is also clear that the candidate 
who lost the most was Doria Medina, especially in 
Pando and Santa Cruz. These results support the 
claim that the opposition could not rise to the chal­
lenge because it was divided. Had Doria Medina 
left the race, perhaps Reyes Villa would have been 
able to build a more significant opposition block. 
But that is all speculation now.
3.  The General Elections of 2009
The December 6, 2009 early general election was 
the result of the Morales government’s success in 
rewriting the Bolivian Constitution and pushing 
for the renewal of the government’s constitutional 
term.5 The new constitution contained a transitional 
clause requiring early elections for president, vice 
president, senators and deputies in order to renew 
the entire political leadership. 
The electoral process began with the approval 
of a new, albeit provisional, electoral law early in 
2009. This law was intended to provide a legal 
framework for the December election and, at the 
same time, generate confidence in the process. In 
April 2009 the European Union’s electoral observ­
ers issued a supportive report with a long list of 
5 The new Constitution was approved in a plebiscite on 
January 25, 2009 and signed into law by President Morales on 
February 7, 2009.
observations and recommendations. Prominent 
among the recommendations were the strengthen­
ing of ballot procedures and a transparent and 
secure voter registration roll. After a difficult ne­
gotiation process, which included a five day hun­
ger strike by the president, the executive and Con­
gress managed to forge the provisional electoral 
law. It included agreements on the most difficult 
issues, such as the special indigenous seats6 and 
the voting rights of Bolivians living overseas7. In 
addition, it called for the implementation of a new 
biometric voter registration system. The electoral 
agency (CNE) rushed to reregister approximately 
five million voters with financial backing from the 
central government (USD 35 million) and political 
backing from all sides. 
As soon as the election rules were set, the gov­
ernment and the opposition began their political 
proselytism. Given the certainty that Evo Morales 
and Alvaro Garcia were going to lead the MAS to 
victory, the government’s main worry was who 
would make up the opposition and whether the 
opposition would be able to unite into a coher­
ent block to confront a very popular President 
Morales. Another key worry for the government 
was to ensure that the elections would take place 
as planned. Due to the complexity of implement­
ing the biometric registration system, the electoral 
schedule remained uncertain until voter registra­
tion was fully completed. Not surprisingly, issues 
such as regional autonomy, education, foreign in­
vestment, health, social policy, the redistribution 
of wealth, etc. played a secondary role in the gov­
ernment’s campaign.
Due to the electoral disasters in the last two 
elections and the persisting political crisis, the 
main opposition parties in Congress fragmented 
further to the point of oblivion. The leader of So­
cial Democratic Power (PODEMOS), Oscar Ortiz, 
failed to gather allies. Jorge Quiroga, former vice 
president and founder of PODEMOS could not 
restore his discredited political image. Former 
president Carlos Mesa had no political capital. 
The only two candidates with some chance were 
Samuel Doria Medina and Manfred Reyes Villa, 
both of whom continued their efforts to build al­
liances. In addition, several MAS dissidents pre­
sented themselves as potential opposition candi­
6 Special seats in the Assembly reserved for representatives of 
the major indigenous groups.
7 Bolivians living in ten cities in Argentina, Brasil, Spain and 
the US.
-  -GIGA Focus International Edition /010
dates, showing that the president’s party was not 
a solidly unified force. Prominent among them 
were former MAS militant Román Loayza, leader 
of the campesinos (peasants) umbrella organiza­
tion (CSUTCB) and co­founder of the party itself; 
Filemon Escobar, MAS ideologue and a close ad­
viser to Morales; and Alejo Veliz, also a campesino 
leader and a MAS dissident. 
All in all, the opposition failed to build a block 
capable of presenting a real alternative to Morales’ 
candidacy and challenging his high approval rat­
ings. Even in the last weeks before the election, 
some candidates kept changing sides or dropping 
from the race altogether. For example, German 
Antelo, the candidate of the Nationalist Revolu­
tionary Movement (MNR), dropped his candidacy 
and joined Reyes Villa’s ticket. Roman Loayza and 
Alejo Veliz lost their running mates weeks before 
election day. They went into the elections without 
a vice president.
As election day approached and the September 
6 deadline for official registration with the CNE 
arrived, the candidate landscape cleared, leaving 
Evo Morales as the major candidate and Manfred 
Reyes Villa and Samuel Doria Medina as the two 
major opposing forces. Reyes Villa scored some 
sympathy points by choosing former Pando pre­
fect Leopoldo Fernandez (currently in jail accused 
of staging the killings in el Porvenir) as his run­
ning mate and allying with Jose Luis Paredes, for­
mer prefect of La Paz, from whom he had adopted 
the PPB­CN party. Further back in the popularity 
race were candidates such as Rene Joaquino, Alejo 
Veliz and Roman Loayza.
While the opposition was sorting itself out, the 
government’s campaign, launched in early 2009, 
followed a concrete plan. First of all, the govern­
ment concentrated on highlighting its successes 
– such as successive fiscal surpluses, record levels 
of international reserves, the nationalization of the 
hydrocarbon and telecommunications sectors, the 
passing of the new constitution and some social 
benefits such as the Juancito Pinto bonus, the Juana 
Azurduy bonus and the Renta Dignidad – while 
also making promises to industrialize Bolivia, in­
crease employment and revamp citizen security. 
Second, Morales effectively used government 
resources in combination with his political cam­
paign – that is, government buildings, vehicles, 
personnel and, above all, the state­owned media. 
The opposition did not succeed in denouncing 
Evo Morales for systematically combining his du­
ties as president and his electoral campaign. For 
example, he traveled all over the country distribu­
ting checks worth hundreds of thousands of dol­
lars for the construction of infrastructure as well 
as donating machinery, delivering finished infra­
structure, opening schools or hospitals, and in­
augurating projects (often financed by the interna­
tional community). 
Third, one of the Morales government’s main 
strategies was to increase the number of voters 
in battleground provinces such as Pando. Once a 
stronghold of the opposition, Pando became a bat­
tleground after the former prefect, Leopoldo Fer­
nandez, was forcefully removed from office. The 
government, referring to a resettlement program 
to distribute land, then moved 1,300 landless peas­
ant families from La Paz and the Chapare region8 
to Pando and at the same time boosted its military 
presence. The opposition saw this program as an 
effort to slant the balance of support in the govern­
ment’s favor as Pando had a relatively small pop­
ulation and any increase could have potentially 
made a difference in terms of legislative seats. 
Morales also mobilized military personnel to vote 
in Pando, even though they were only temporarily 
stationed there.
Fourth, Morales attacked his opponents using 
legal means. In the last two months leading up to 
the election, the anticorruption and transparency 
minister Nardi Suxo issued repeated statements 
on several corruption charges against Reyes Villa 
related to his term as prefect.9 These legal troubles 
prevented Reyes Villa from campaigning outside 
Bolivia. 
Fifth, the government suspended public fi­
nancing for political campaigns. As a result, 
smaller parties such as MUSPA, Gente and Pulso 
could not achieve national attention. The weak­
ened and disoriented opposition did not respond 
to this issue. Sixth, the MAS campaigned against 
the “crossed vote”10 by tightening controls on 
militants at the local level. Several organizations 
that make up MAS, such as the campesino organi­
zations (CSUTCB) and the Bartolina Sisa women’s 
organization expressed their intent to oblige their 
members to give both votes to MAS. Finally, an 
8 The Chapare region in Cochabamba is a stronghold of Evo 
Morales.
9 La Razon, November 19, 2009, online: <http://www.la­razon.
com/versiones/20091119_006916/nota_244_911944.htm>.
10 The ballot, being divided in to two areas, gave the possibility 
of voting for a party and a candidate of another party. This 
was known as the voto cruzado (crossed vote).
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important MAS strategy was to invite intellectuals 
and professionals to join its candidate lists in or­
der to gain support from the urban middle classes. 
To that end, Morales invited people such as Ana 
Maria Campero, former ombudswoman and jour­
nalist, to participate in his government. 
One aspect characterizing the political cam­
paign on both sides was violence. In the last days 
leading up to election day MAS supporters at­
tacked the private house of Reyes Villa, while in 
Tarija MAS supporters were physically attacked by 
opposition forces. The cities of Sucre, Tarija, and 
Santa Cruz, which formed the backbone of the op­
position, were the scene of violent confrontations 
between government and opposition militants. 
Some local leaders and MAS supporters prohib­
ited the opposition’s political campaign in their 
territories, mostly around La Paz. In addition, on 
various occasions the police forces, questionably, 
did not interfere to stop such violence.
4.  The Implications
The sweeping and historic result of the December 
6 election has a number of implications for Bo­
livian politics and for the current government and 
its policies. Firstly, Morales has improved the le­
gitimacy of his government. He was able to sig­
nificantly increase his support in comparison to 
the 2005 election and achieve a two­thirds major­
ity. Secondly, Morales and MAS have managed to 
break up the once seemingly solid opposition of 
the media luna by winning over senators and dep­
uties from the opposition. As a result of Morales’ 
well­developed political strategy of concentrating 
on the media luna, his party was able to gain two 
senators in Pando, one in Beni and two in Tarija. 
It has thereby gained control of 24 of 36 seats in 
the Senate and 84 of 130 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies, giving Morales an absolute majority in 
the legislature. Thirdly, with this new power, the 
reelected president can avoid standoffs with the 
opposition, something which occurred regularly 
in the last period, and carry on with his agenda 
to implement the new constitution. Fourthly, Mo­
rales’ overwhelming win has imparted deep un­
certainty among the current opposition forces. 
These parties are severely restricted in provid­
ing some kind of functioning opposition to the 
government. 
5.  The Next Steps
The reelected government has several tasks on its 
agenda. It is set to begin the campaign for the up­
coming April 2010 prefecture and municipal elec­
tions immediately. There will also be intense work 
in the Legislative Assembly because the govern­
ment will soon have to approve a law providing 
the legal framework for the constitutionally man­
dated regional, municipal and indigenous auton­
omy.11 At the same time, the Morales government 
will need to pass more than 100 laws to accom­
modate the new constitution. Prioritized among 
the latter are laws to reform the judicial branch 
(Supreme Court and Constitutional Court) and 
the electoral court, along with those that will help 
Morales consolidate Bolivia’s plurinational state. 
This effort will require legislative support.
Some constraints to government policies on 
the part of intellectual and middle­class assembly 
members within MAS, especially in the Senate, is 
to be expected however. Part of the MAS’s strategy 
to gain support from non­indigenous urban voters 
was to include middle­class candidates who were 
not party militants. These people only joined the 
party in the few months leading up to election day 
and are therefore deeply mistrusted by the rank 
and file party members because they might not 
fully share the president’s or the party’s agenda. 
Moreover, some of these people might have had 
other political alliances. As opportunist as the lat­
ter might be, the MAS cannot be 100 percent sure 
of their support at crucial times.
The current opposition has been significantly 
constrained, in both the Legislative Assembly 
and the political arena. Together, Reyes Villa and 
Doria Medina captured 33 percent of the vote in 
the December elections. That leaves them with a 
very weak voice in Congress and a doubtful role 
in the new legislature. In contrast, the traditional 
opposition, made up of traditional parties such as 
MNR, ADN, MIR, CSU, etc., seems to have opted 
to retreat from the national arena to the depart­
mental and municipal political arenas as part of a 
strategy to reorient itself and, in the process, build 
a more relevant and articulate opposition. These 
parties, which once dominated the national polit­
ical arena, seem to have discovered the relevance 
11 Indigenous autonomy refers to a regional autonomy with 
emphasis on indigenous identity. It could be a municipality 
as well. The indigenous lable is an important factor in the 
Morales government.
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of local politics upon the advent of a constitution­
ally mandated process to implement regional and 
municipal autonomy. By the time autonomy be­
comes a reality and the country becomes more de­
centralized, these political forces will be well po­
sitioned and the government will face a new kind 
of opposition, one that is less dependent on the 
central government. It is to be expected that these 
oppositional forces will take part in the next pre­
fecture and municipal elections on April 4, 2010.
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